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Abstract
Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected
utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory. Under rank dependent
utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude
of a decision maker. The same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion:
utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. The main finding is that these two forms can
have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that exhibit a weak monotonicity
property. In particular, in a large class of bargaining problems both increased utility risk aversion
and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent are advantagous for a player. This is
demonstrated for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution does
not behave regularly in this respect. Keywords: Bargaining, risk aversion, rank dependent utility.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: 026, 022.
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1 Introduction
A bargaining problem is described by a set of potential outcomes, including a so-called disagreement
outcome. The bargainers try to reach agreement on one of the outcomes or on a lottery between
these outcomes. If they fail, the disagreement outcome results. A bargaining solution suggests
an agreement outcome or lottery for each possible bargaining problem. In this paper, the so-
called welfarist approach to bargaining is adopted. In this approach, the solution to the bargaining
problem depends exclusively on its image in utility space.
The axiomatic approach to two-person bargaining problems was initiated by Nash [9], under the
assumption that the two bargainers maximize expected utility. In expected utility, risk aversion is
an important empirical phenomenon. Yaari [21] provides an intuitive definition of risk aversion and
shows that under expected utility one decision maker is more risk averse than another if and only
if the utility function of the former is a strictly increasing concave transformation of that of the
latter. An interesting question, first studied by Kannai [7] and Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler
[8], concerns the effect of risk aversion on the outcomes predicted by bargaining solutions. Their
answers to this question confirm a plausible intuition: it is advantagous to play against a more risk
averse bargainer. These results are driven by the fact that a more risk averse bargainer has a more
concave utility function. Therefore, utility at low levels increases at a faster rate and satisfaction
may appear faster. Because most bargaining solutions are sensitive to this, a more risk averse
bargainer may be easier to satisfy, which is advantagous for the opponent (cf. Peters, [10]).
Expected utility as a normative basis for decision making is appealing, but as empirical findings
show, it is descriptively unsatisfactory. Therefore, alternative models have been developed of which
rank dependent utility (Quiggin, [11]), which extends expected utility by allowing for distortion of
probabilities, is the best known.
Our paper considers bargaining problems where the bargainers’ preferences can be represented
by rank dependent utility. In this model Yaari’s concept of increased risk aversion has still the same
natural meaning: a more risk averse person prefers less lotteries over each riskless alternative. In
contrast with expected utility, however, not only the utility function but also a probability weighting
function determines the risk attitude of a decision maker. An elegant and simple characterization of
increased risk aversion as in the case of expected utility is not yet available. Chateauneuf and Cohen
[2] provide some partial results. Chew, Karni, and Safra [3] characterize aversion to mean-preserving
spreads, which is more restrictive than risk aversion.
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In the present paper, two factors of risk aversion are distinguished: utility risk aversion (as in
the expected utility model), associated with the utility function; and probabilistic risk aversion,
associated with the probability weighting function. In our application to bargaining we concentrate
on the latter, because the results for the former are closely related to those in expected utility. As in
the related literature, the central question is: is it advantagous or disadvantagous to bargain with
a more risk averse person? In Section 3, we investigate the impact of both utility and probabilistic
risk aversion for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, [5]). The main
finding is that in a large class of bargaining problems, it is advantagous to have a less probabilisti-
cally risk averse, or a more utility risk averse opponent. The known effect of risk aversion for the
expected utility case (cf. Kihlstrom et al., [8]) is a special case of the latter result. Since both forms
of risk aversion arise from the same concept of comparative risk aversion, this contrast is rather
surprising. On closer inspection, however, it is not counterintuitive that increased probabilistic risk
aversion of the opponent could be bad for a player, because such an opponent might insist on larger
probabilities for good alternatives and thereby reduce the other player’s utility.
The two results also have some strategic implications, if it is assumed that bargainers can be
dishonest about their true preferences and pretend to evaluate lotteries by means of a different
utility or probability weighting function. Specifically, it does not pay to pretend to be less prob-
abilistically risk averse, or more utility risk averse, but it might sometimes pay to pretend to be
more probabilistically or less utility risk averse. For the expected utility case related papers in this
direction are Crawford and Varian [4] and Sobel [17,18].
Although our focus is on the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution the main results in this paper can be
extended to solutions that exhibit some form of monotonicity. Typically, these do not include the
Nash bargaining solution. If this solution is used, a more probabilistically risk averse opponent
might be better but also worse for a player. We justify the use of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion in bargaining under rank dependent utility by showing that the axiomatization of Kalai and
Smorodinsky [5] still makes sense (see Section 4).
Axiomatic bargaining without expected utility has been studied in other articles (Rubinstein,
Safra, and Thomson, [13]; Safra and Zilcha, [14]; Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha, [15]; Burgos, Grant, and
Kaji, [1]; and Volij and Winter, [22]). The paper of Volij and Winter [22] is closest to the present
paper. It applies Yaari’s dual theory of choice to bargaining problems where the set of alternatives
consists of all distributions of one unit of a perfectly divisible good, and uses the stronger notion of
aversion to mean-preserving spreads to study changes in the Nash solution. Shalev [16] has studied
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the effect of loss aversion—see also Section 5.
The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Rank dependent utility
Throughout, the set A of riskless alternatives is a nonempty compact topological space. A lottery
is a probability measure with finite support on A, typically denoted by P = (p1, a1; . . . ; pn, an)
where a1, . . . , an ∈ A, pi ≥ 0 for all i, and ∑ni=1 pi = 1. The set of all lotteries is L(A). A riskless
alternative a ∈ A is identified with the lottery (1, a) ∈ L(A).
A utility function U : A→ R is a continuous function that assigns to each riskless alternative a
real number, expressing its value for a decision maker. A weighting function is a continuous, strictly
increasing function w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1, representing the decision maker’s
personal appraisal of probabilities. For a decision maker with utility function U, the preferences
over L(A) can be modelled by rank dependent utility (RDU) if there exists a weighting function w,
such that preferences are represented by the functional RDU : L(A)→ IR defined by
RDU(P ) = w(pρ(1))U(aρ(1)) +
n∑
i=2
[w(pρ(1) + · · ·+ pρ(i))− w(pρ(1) + · · ·+ pρ(i−1))]U(aρ(i)),
where ρ is a permutation that orders the riskless alternatives in the lottery from best to worse, i.e.,
U(aρ(1)) ≥ . . . ≥ U(aρ(n)) (cf. Quiggin, [11]). Expected utility holds if w(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Rank dependent utility, in contrast to expected utility, permits transformations of probabilities.
An alternative is weighted by the transformed probability of obtaining the alternative or something
better minus the transformed probability of obtaining something better.
2.2 Comparative risk aversion
Yaari [20] introduced a natural definition of risk aversion. A decision maker is more risk averse than
another one, if whenever the former (weakly) prefers a lottery to a riskless alternative the latter
also does. In expected utility it is a well known result that one decision maker is more risk averse
than a second one if the utility function of the first is a strictly increasing concave transformation of
that of the second. Under rank dependent utility, a second component influences the risk attitude,
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namely, the weighting function. In the lemma below and in the rest of the paper we consider these
two components separately, by keeping one fixed and varying the other.
Definition 2.1 Let the preferences over L(A) of two decision makers (DM and D˜M) be represented
by RDU-functionals RDU and R˜DU . D˜M is more risk averse than DM if for all a ∈ A and all
P ∈ L(A) with R˜DU(P ) ≥ R˜DU(a) also RDU(P ) ≥ RDU(a).
Lemma 2.2 Let the preferences over L(A) of DM and D˜M be represented by RDU and R˜DU
with utility functions U and U˜ and weighting functions w and w˜, respectively.
1. If w = w˜ then D˜M is more risk averse than DM if and only if there exists a concave strictly
increasing function k : R→ R such that U˜ = k ◦ U .
2. If U = αU˜ +β for α, β ∈ R, α > 0 then D˜M is more risk averse than DM if w˜(p) ≤ w(p) for
all p ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, if U = U˜ this implies that R˜DU(P ) ≤ RDU(P ) for all P ∈ L(A).
If A is connected, the “only if” implication in part 2 of Lemma 2.2 also holds. In the situation of
Lemma 2.2, part 1, we say that decision maker D˜M is more utility risk averse than decision maker
DM ; whereas in the situation of Lemma 2.2, part 2, we say that D˜M is more probabilistically risk
averse than DM . Although the above result is well known and simple to prove, it was not yet stated
as in Lemma 2.2. Part 1 of the lemma is a generalization of Yaari’s result [20] for expected utility; a
predecessor of part 2 can be found in Yaari [21]. A proof can also be deduced from Chateauneuf and
Cohen [2]. A general characterization of comparative risk aversion that allows for varying utility
and weighting functions at the same time, is not yet available.
2.3 Bargaining problems and solutions
As before, a nonempty compact topological space A is the set of riskless alternatives. Let RDU1
and RDU2 : L(A)→ R be the RDU-functionals of two bargainers with utility functions U1 and U2
and weighting functions w1 and w2, respectively. A designated element a ∈ A is the disagreement
alternative. We assume throughout that there is a lottery P ∈ L(A) with RDU1(P ) > U1(a) and
RDU2(P ) > U2(a). The two bargainers try to reach an agreement in L(A). If they fail, a results.
The quadruple (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) is called a (two-person) bargaining problem. B is the set of all
bargaining problems.
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For a bargaining problem B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2), define
S(B) = cl{(RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) : P ∈ L(A)} and
d(B) = (U1(a), U2(a)),
where ‘cl’ denotes the (topological) closure. The point d(B) is called the disagreement outcome.
The set S(B) is called the feasible set of B. It is a compact subset of IR2. In contrast to the case
of bargaining problems under expected utility, examples (with infinite A) can be constructed where
the set {(RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) : P ∈ L(A)} is not closed.
We define
S = {(S, d) : S = S(B) and d = d(B) for some B ∈ B}.
A bargaining solution is a map F : S→ R2 that assigns to each (S, d) ∈ S an element of S. In the
rest of the paper, we also write F (B) instead of F (S(B), d(B)).
2.4 Feasible sets of bargaining problems
Under expected utility, the set of all possible feasible sets is the set of all compact convex sets
in R2. Because of continuity of the weighting functions, a feasible set S(B) is connected under
rank dependent utility, but it is not necessarily convex. It does, however, satisfy a weaker form of
convexity, as formulated in the following lemma.
For any points s and t in R2 denote by [s, t] the straight line segment with s and t as endpoints,
i.e., the convex hull of s and t. The vector inequality t > s means ti > si for i = 1, 2, and t ≥ s
means ti ≥ si for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 2.3 Let (S, d) ∈ S. Then for all s, t ∈ S with s1 = t1 or s2 = t2 we have [s, t] ⊆ S.
This lemma implies in particular that a feasible set S is not only connected but also simply con-
nected: it contains no ‘holes’ (cf. Lemma A.1 in the Appendix).
For (S, d) ∈ S the Pareto optimal set P (S) is defined by
P (S) = {s ∈ S : there exists no t ∈ S with t ≥ s and t 6= s},
Instead of P (S(B)) we also write P (B).
The following lemma implies that the Pareto optimal set is connected.
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Lemma 2.4 Let (S, d) ∈ S. Then there is a closed interval I ⊂ R and a continuous strictly
decreasing function f : I → R such that P (S) is the graph of f , that is,
P (S) = {(t, f(t)) : t ∈ I}.
Lemma 2.4 says that Pareto optimal subset of a feasible set S behaves nicely: there are no indenta-
tions nor even horizontal or vertical line segments. Analogous results can be derived for the other
parts of the boundary of S (cf. Lemma A.3 in the Appendix). Lemma 2.3 implies that also the
possibly flat parts in the north, east, south, and west cannot have indentations.
The next lemma provides a partial answer to the converse question: Which nonempty compact
subsets S of R2 can be generated as feasible sets of bargaining problems under rank dependent
utility? The lemma says that every connected compact Pareto optimal set can be generated by an
underlying bargaining problem.
Lemma 2.5 Let I ⊂ R be a nonempty closed interval and let f : I → R be a continuous strictly
decreasing function. Then there is a B ∈ B such that P (B) is the graph of f , that is,
P (B) = {(t, f(t)) : t ∈ I}.
2.5 The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
For (S, d) ∈ S, the utopia point is defined by:
u(S, d) = (max{s1 : s ∈ S, s ≥ d},max{s2 : s ∈ S, s ≥ d}).
For B ∈ B we also write u(B) instead of u(S(B), d(B)). The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution KS (Kalai
and Smorodinsky, [5]) assigns to each (S, d) ∈ S the maximal point of S on the line segment with
d and u(S, d) as endpoints. It is well defined because S is compact. By Lemma 2.4, KS(S, d) is a
Pareto optimal point for every (S, d) ∈ S.
This is an adaptation of the definition of KS for expected utility to rank dependent utility.
Under expected utility, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can be justified and characterized by a set
of axioms (Kalai and Smorodinsky, [5]). This axiomatization can be extended to the rank dependent
utility case, as we will show in Section 4 below.
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Figure 1: Diagram (a) illustrates Theorem 3.1 and diagram (b) illustrates Theorem 3.2. In both
diagrams, z = KS(B) and zˆ = KS(C). The solid dots correspond to riskless alternatives.
3 Sensitivity of the KS bargaining solution to risk
We investigate the sensitivity of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to changes in the risk
attitude of the bargainers. We first assume that both bargainers weakly prefer all riskless alter-
natives to the disagreement alternative, a condition which will be weakened in Section 3.4. We
examine the changes in the outcome suggested by the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution if the
risk aversion of one of the players changes. First, we keep the weighting function fixed and vary
the utility function; second, we keep the utility function fixed and vary the weighting function. The
first case is a generalization to rank dependent utility of known results for expected utility.
Define B+ = {B ∈ B : s ≥ d(B) for all s ∈ S(B)}.
3.1 Utility risk aversion
Theorem 3.1 Let B and C be bargaining problems in B+ that are identical except that player 2 is
more utility risk averse in C than in B. Then KS1(B) ≤ KS1(C).
The theorem says that a player does not lose when bargaining with a (new) more utility risk averse
opponent. Figure 1(a) illustrates this. In the picture we use the fact that under rank dependent
utility, the utility function is unique up to scale and location and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
satisfies scale invariance (see Section 4), so player 2’s utility function in bargaining problem C can
be scaled such that d(B) = d(C) and u(B) = u(C).
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3.2 Probabilistic risk aversion
Theorem 3.2 Let B and C be bargaining problems in B+ that are identical except that player 2 is
more probabilistically risk averse in C than in B. Then KS1(B) ≥ KS1(C).
Theorem 3.2 says that a player does not profit from bargaining with a (new) more probabilistically
risk averse opponent. This is illustrated in Figure 1(b), where the utility functions of players 2 in
B and C are taken to be equal (cf. Lemma 2.2, part 2, and recall that KS is scale invariant).
Observe that both in Theorem 3.1 and in Theorem 3.2 the players 2 in B and C are different
players, so that neither these results nor the associated diagrams imply anything about gains or
losses of these players. See also the discussion below.
3.3 Discussion and strategic implications
Although utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion have a similar impact on the preferences
of a decision maker, namely, the more utility or probabilistically risk averse a player is, the less
lotteries are preferred over each sure alternative, they have contrary effects in bargaining problems
with respect to the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. An intuition for this is as follows.
If a player can choose between a more and a less utility risk averse opponent, it is advisable
to choose the more utility risk averse one, because the marginal utility of the more utility risk
averse player diminishes faster, so that this player is easier to satisfy. But if a player can choose
between a more and a less probabilistically risk averse opponent, it is advisable to choose the
less probabilistically risk adverse one, because the more probabilistically risk averse player weighs
probabilities for alternatives with high outcomes lower and therefore asks for more security for
obtaining high outcomes.
These considerations represent a positive view: they are of interest for the case in which the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution offers a good description of the bargaining outcome. Additionally, it is
interesting to consider the strategic implications of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 for a bargainer under the
assumption that preferences are private knowledge, so that it is possible to be dishonest about the
true preferences. These implications are relevant from a normative point of view, in particular, for
the question of mechanism design.
Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) be a bargaining problem, where RDU2 corresponds to the true
preferences of player 2. We consider four cases, namely that player 2 pretends to be more or less
utility or probabilistically risk averse. For simplicity, it is assumed for the rest of this subsection
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that A is finite. This ensures that the image of L(A) in R2 is closed and, therefore, it also ensures
the existence of a lottery with rank dependent utility image equal to the point suggested by the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Nevertheless, analogous results can be derived for infinite A.
1. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be more utility risk averse, with preferences
represented by R˜DU2? Let C = (A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2). We assume that R˜DU2 is scaled such that
d(B) = d(C) and u(B) = u(C). Let P,Q ∈ L(A) such that KS(B) = (RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) and
KS(C) = (RDU1(Q), R˜DU2(Q)). Theorem 3.1 implies that RDU1(P ) ≤ RDU1(Q). If RDU1(P ) <
RDU1(Q), then Pareto optimality implies RDU2(P ) > RDU2(Q). If RDU1(P ) = RDU1(Q), then
RDU2(P ) = R˜DU2(Q), because d(B) = d(C) and u(B) = u(C). But R˜DU2(Q) ≥ RDU2(Q)
by Lemma 2.2. Hence, in every case RDU2(P ) ≥ RDU2(Q). Thus, player 2 never profits from
pretending to be more utility risk averse.
2. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be less utility risk averse, with preferences
represented by R̂DU2? Nothing can be said in general here, as the following example shows.
Example 3.3 Let A = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0.55, 0.55)}, A = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0.5, 0.9))}, a =
(0, 0), Ui(a) = ai for i ∈ {1, 2}, Û2(0) = 0, Û2(0.55) = 0.2, Û2(0.9) = 0.55, Û2(1) = 1, and w1(p) =
w2(p) = ŵ2(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) and C = (A, a,RDU1, R̂DU2).
Moreover, let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) and C = (A, a,RDU1, R̂DU2). The lotteries that give rise
to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are, respectively
P = (1, (0.55, 0.55)),
Q = (
1
2
, (1, 0);
1
2
, (0, 1)),
P = (
2
7
, (1, 0);
5
7
, (0.5, 0.9)),
Q = (1; (0.55, 0.55)).
We have
RDU2(P ) = 0.55 > 0.5 = RDU2(Q),
but
RDU2(P ) =
9
14
< 0.55 = RDU2(Q).
Hence, pretending to be less utility risk averse can be advantagous (player 2 in the pair B,C) but
also disadvantagous (player 2 in the pair B,C). ¤
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3. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be less probabilistically risk averse with
preferences represented by R̂DU2? Let C = (A, a,RDU1, R̂DU2), and assume again that the
utility function Û2 of player 2 is scaled such that d(C) = d(B) and u(C) = u(B), i.e., Û2 = U2.
Let P,Q ∈ L(A) such that KS(B) = (RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) and KS(C) = (RDU1(Q), R̂DU2(Q)).
Theorem 3.2 implies that RDU1(P ) ≤ RDU1(Q). If RDU1(P ) < RDU1(Q), then Pareto optimality
implies RDU2(P ) > RDU2(Q). If RDU1(P ) = RDU1(Q), then RDU2(P ) = R̂DU2(Q), because
d(C) = d(B) and u(C) = u(B). But R̂DU2(Q) ≥ RDU2(Q) by Lemma 2.2. Hence, in every case
RDU2(P ) ≥ RDU2(Q). Thus, player 2 never profits from pretending to be less probabilistically
risk averse.
4. Does it make sense for player 2 to pretend to be more probabilistically risk averse, with
preferences represented by R˜DU2? Nothing can be said in general here, as the following example
shows.
Example 3.4 Let A = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}, A = A ∪ {(0.55, 0.55)}, a = (0, 0), Ui(a) = ai for all
a ∈ A, i ∈ {1, 2}, w1(p) = p, w2(p) = √p, w˜2(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2)
and C = (A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2), and let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) and C = (A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2).
The lotteries that give rise to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in B,C,B, and C, are, respectively,
P ≈ (0.618, (1, 0); 0.382, (0, 1)),
Q = (0.5, (1, 0); 0.5, (0, 1)),
P ≈ (0.461, (1, 0); 0.241, (0, 1); 0.298, (0.55, 0.55)),
Q = (1, (0.55, 0.55)).
We have
RDU2(P ) ≈ 0.618 < 0.707 ≈ RDU2(Q),
but
RDU2(P ) ≈ 0.625 > 0.55 = RDU2(Q).
Hence, pretending to be more probabilistically risk averse can be advantagous (player 2 in the pair
B,C) but also disadvantagous (player 2 in the pair B,C). ¤
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3.4 Extension from B+ to B
In this subsection the restrictions in Theorem 3.2 on bargaining problems are weakened. Riskless
alternatives are permitted that are worse than the disagreement alternative for one or both players.
In the following, we only consider the effect of weighting functions. For results concerning utility
risk aversion in the expected utility case, see Roth and Rothblum [12].
Unfortunately, Theorem 3.2 cannot be generalized to an arbitrary compact set A of riskless
alternatives without any further restrictions, as the following example shows.
Example 3.5 Let A = {(0, 0), (1, 1), (−1, 2)}, a = (0, 0), Ui = ai for all a ∈ A, i ∈ {1, 2},
w1(p) = p, w2(p) =
√
p, w˜2(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) and C =
(A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2). Then
KS(B) ≈ (0.724, 1.929)
but
KS(C) = (
3
4
,
9
8
).
Hence player 1 obtains more in the game with the more risk averse player 2. ¤
Nevertheless we can still partially generalize Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.6 Let B and C be bargaining problems in B that are identical except that player 2 is
more probabilistically risk averse in C than in B. If
u2(B)− d2(B)
u1(B)− d1(B) ≤
u2(C)− d2(C)
u1(C)− d1(C) , (1)
then KS1(C) ≤ KS1(B).
Condition (1) says that the line segment with d(C) and u(C) as endpoints is steeper (has a higher
slope) than the line segment with d(B) and u(B) as endpoints. If d(B) = d(C) —which can always
be arranged without loss of generality—condition (1) holds in particular if U1(a) ≥ d1(B) for all
a ∈ A, that is, if player 1 weakly prefers all riskless alternatives to the disagreement alternative.
4 An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
solution
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for rank dependent utility bargaining problems can be character-
ized by a similar set of conditions as in the expected utility case (see Kalai and Smorodinsky, [5]).
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The axioms are as follows, formulated for a bargaining solution F .
Symmetry For every (S, d) ∈ B with (i) if (s1, s2) ∈ S then also (s2, s1) ∈ S; (ii) d1 = d2, we have
F1(S, d) = F2(S, d).
Scale invariance For all (S, d) ∈ S and a, b ∈ R2 with a > 0, we have F (aS + b, ad + b) =
aF (S, d) + b, where ax := (a1x1, a2x2) for all x ∈ R2 and aS + b := {as+ b : s ∈ S}.
Weak Pareto optimality For every (S, d) ∈ S there is no x ∈ S with x > F (S, d).
Individual monotonicity For all (S, d), (S, d) ∈ S and all i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} with (i) S ⊆ S; (ii)
d = d; and (iii) ui(S, d) = ui(S, d), we have Fj(S, d) ≤ Fj(S, d).
Observe that these conditions still make sense in the rank dependent utility setting. In particular,
scale invariance reflects the fact that the utility function in rank dependent utility is unique up to
a positive linear transformation. Also the following characterization is similar to the one obtained
in Kalai and Smorodinsky [5] but in the proof (see the Appendix) the construction of auxiliary
bargaining problems needs special attention because of the different domain, in particular the
presence and construction of nonconvex problems.
Theorem 4.1 Let F be a bargaining solution. Then F satisfies symmetry, scale invariance, weak
Pareto optimality and individual monotonicity if, and only if, F = KS.
5 Conclusion
It has been shown in this paper that, with respect to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, in many
situations it is on the one hand not advantagous to bargain against a more probabilistically risk
averse opponent, but on the other hand also not advantagous to bargain against a less utility risk
averse opponent. These results are surprising, since both probabilistic and utility risk aversion
arise from the same definition of risk aversion. The intuition behind the results could be that a
more utility risk averse bargainer is easier to satisfy and is therefore less demanding in a bargaining
problem, whereas a more probabilistically risk averse bargainer wants a higher guarantee to obtain
good outcomes and is therefore more demanding. In this paper we varied the attitude towards risk
either with respect to the weighting function or with respect to the utility function, and kept the
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other component fixed. It may be interesting to design an experiment to test which of the two
components has more influence in bargaining problems.
The main results can be generalized to n-person bargaining problems with the restriction that the
feasible sets are made comprehensive. It is also possible to adapt the results to bargaining solutions
exhibiting certain monotonicity properties. For instance, the egalitarian bargaining solution defined
on the set of comprehensive problems or the Kalai-Rosenthal solution (Kalai and Rosenthal, [6])
are such candidates.
The extension of the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, [9]) to bargaining problems under rank
dependent utility is more problematic. In particular, feasible sets are not necessarily convex, so that
the Nash bargaining solution is not uniquely defined. Nevertheless, even if we restrict attention to
bargaining problems where the Nash bargaining solution is well defined, it does not behave regularly.
Both cases can arise: a player can gain or lose with respect to the Nash bargaining solution when
bargaining with a more probabilistically risk averse opponent.
Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, [19]) differs from rank dependent utility
in the sense that probabilities are weighted in a different way, depending on whether the associated
riskless alternatives are preferred to a specific reference point or not. All of the above results can be
generalized to cumulative prospect theory. There, a distinction between gains and losses is made,
and a third factor influences the risk attitude of a decision maker, namely loss aversion. The impact
of loss aversion in bargaining problems is a subject for further research. Also Shalev [16] considers
loss aversion in bargaining but in a quite different framework.
A Appendix: Proofs
Before proving Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 we first prove some auxiliary results from which these lemmas
will be derived. By || · || we denote the Euclidean norm on R2. We say that a feasible set S has a
hole if there is an h ∈ R2 and an ε > 0 such that (i) x /∈ S for all x ∈ R2 with ||x− h|| < ε and (ii)
for every x ∈ R2 with x 6= 0 there is a number λx > 0 with h+ λxx ∈ S.
Lemma A.1 Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) ∈ B. Then S(B) contains no holes.
Proof. Define T = {(RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) : P ∈ L(A)}. By definition, S(B) =cl{T}. We say
that T contains an almost-hole if there exists an h ∈ R2 and a ε > 0 such that (i) x /∈ S for all
x ∈ R2 with ||x − h|| < ε and (ii) there is a y ∈ R2 such that for every x ∈ R2 with x 6= 0 and
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x 6= τy for every number τ ≥ 0 there is a number λx > 0 with h + λxx ∈ S. Since T is connected
and S(B) is the closure of T , it is sufficient to show that T contains no almost-holes. We first prove
the following claim.
Claim. For all s, t ∈ T with either s1 = t1 or s2 = t2 the straight line segment between these two
points is contained in T, i.e., [s, t] ⊆ T .
Proof of the Claim: Let s, t ∈ T with s2 = t2 (the case s1 = t1 is analogous). Let P =
(p1, a1; . . . ; pk, ak) and Q = (q1, b1; . . . ; qn, bn) ∈ L(A) with (RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) = s and
(RDU1(Q), RDU2(Q)) = t. Without loss of generality assume that all probabilities in P and Q are
positive, and let C = {a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bn}. Let U2 be the utility function of player 2.
Case 1: For all c ∈ C, U2(c) = s2. Then all lotteries on elements of C have rank dependent
utility equal to s2 for player 2 and all points in [s, t] can be obtained by such lotteries. Hence,
[s, t] ⊆ T .
Case 2: There are c, c˜ ∈ C with U2(c) 6= U2(c˜). Let c ∈ argmax{U2(c) : c ∈ C} and c ∈
argmin{U2(c) : c ∈ C}. Clearly, U2(c) > s2 > U2(c). Let R = (ρ, c; 1 − ρ, c) be the unique lottery
with RDU2(R) = s2. Let r = (RDU1(R), RDU2(R)), then we will show that the straight line
segment between s and r is in T . Similarly, it can be shown that the straight line segment between
r and t is in T . Therefore, the straight line segment between s and t is contained in T .
Observe that for every lottery P˜ = (p˜1, a1; . . . ; p˜k, ak; p˜k+1, c; p˜k+2, c) with RDU2(P˜ ) = s2, for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and for every ε with 0 ≤ ε ≤ p˜i, there exist some λ, pi ≥ 0 with λ+ pi = ε such
that for the lottery P˜ ε = (p˜1, a1; . . . ; p˜i−1, ai−1; p˜i− ε, ai; p˜i+1, ai+1; . . . ; p˜k, ak; p˜k+1+λ, c; p˜k+2+pi, c)
we have RDU2(P˜ ε) = s2.
Starting with P we now gradually construct new lotteries with RDU2-value equal to s2 by
shifting, for every ai /∈ {c, c}, the corresponding decision weight pi in a continuous way simultanously
to c and c until we reach R, such that the RDU2-value stays constant. In this way we obtain every
point on the straight line segment between s and r as the image of at least one of the contructed
lotteries. This completes the proof of the Claim.
We now continue with the proof of the lemma. Assume for contradiction that T contains an
almost-hole, and let h ∈ R2 be as in the definition of an almost-hole. In particular, there exist
λ(1,0), λ(−1,0) > 0 with h + λ(1,0)(1, 0), h + λ(−1,0)(−1, 0) ∈ T, or there exist λ(0,1), λ(0,−1) > 0 with
h + λ(0,1)(0, 1), h + λ(0,−1)(0,−1) ∈ T . Assume the former is the case, the latter is analogous.
Observe that (h + λ(1,0)(1, 0))2 = (h + λ(−1,0)(−1, 0))2 = h2. Hence the Claim implies that [h −
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λ(−1,0)(1, 0), h + λ(1,0)(1, 0)] ⊆ T . In particular, h ∈ T, which contradicts (i) in the definition of an
almost-hole. Therefore, T contains no almost-holes and the proof of the lemma is complete. ¤
The following lemma is needed to derive Lemma 2.4.
Lemma A.2 Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) ∈ B with utility functions U1 and U2 and weighting
functions w1 and w2 for players 1 and 2, respectively. Let b
2 ∈ argmax{U2(a) : a ∈ A} and
b
1 ∈ argmax{U1(a) : a ∈ A}. Let S = S(B) and x ∈ P (S). Then
(i) if x2 < U2(b
2
) then for every ε > 0 there is a y ∈ S with y1 < x1, y2 > x2, and ||x− y|| < ε.
(ii) if x1 < U1(b
1
) then for every ε > 0 there is a y ∈ S with y2 < x2, y1 > x1, and ||x− y|| < ε.
Proof. We only prove (i), the proof of (ii) is analogous. Suppose that (i) is not true. Together
with x ∈ P (S) this implies that there is a εˆ > 0 such that
S ∩ {y ∈ R2 : ||y − x|| < εˆ, y2 > x2} = ∅. (2)
Let P ∈ L(A) be an arbitrary lottery with RDU2(P ) ≤ x2. Such a lottery is of the form
P = (p0, b
2
; p1, a1; . . . ; pn, an) with U2(b
2
) ≥ U2(a1) ≥ · · · ≥ U2(an), and possibly, p0 = 0.
Claim 1. There is a number 0 ≤ p < 1, independent of P , such that p0 ≤ p.
Proof of Claim 1. Let b2 ∈ argmin{U2(a) : a ∈ A}. Since RDU2(P ) ≤ x2 we have
x2 ≥ w2(p0)U2(b2) +
n∑
i=1
[w2(p
0 + · · ·+ pi)− w2(p0 + · · ·+ pi−1)]U2(ai)
≥ w2(p0)U2(b2) +
n∑
i=1
[w2(p
0 + · · ·+ pi)− w2(p0 + · · ·+ pi−1)]U2(b2)
= w2(p
0)[U2(b
2
)− U2(b2)] + U2(b2).
Hence
w2(p
0) ≤ x2 − U2(b
2)
U2(b
2
)− U2(b2)
< 1,
so that
p0 ≤ w−12 (
x2 − U2(b2)
U2(b
2
)− U2(b2)
) := p < 1.
This proves the claim.
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Claim 2. Let m = 1
2
(x2 + U2(b
2
)), and let k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that U2(ai) < m ⇔ i ≥ k. Then
there is a number 0 < p ≤ 1, independent of P , such that ∑ni=k pi ≥ p.
Proof of Claim 2. Since RDU2(P ) ≤ x2 we have
x2 ≥ w2(p0)U2(b2) +
n∑
i=1
[w2(p
0 + · · ·+ pi)− w2(p0 + · · ·+ pi−1)]U2(ai)
≥ w2(p0)U2(b2) +
k−1∑
i=1
[w2(p
0 + · · ·+ pi)− w2(p0 + · · ·+ pi−1)]m
+
n∑
i=k
[w2(p
0 + · · ·+ pi)− w2(p0 + · · ·+ pi−1)]U2(b2)
= w2(p
0)U2(b
2
)− w2(p0)m+ w(p0 + · · ·+ pk−1)[m− U2(b2)] + U2(b2)
≥ w2(p0 + · · ·+ pk−1)[m− U2(b2)] + U2(b2).
Hence
w2(p
0 + · · ·+ pk−1) ≤ x2 − U2(b
2)
m− U2(b2)
< 1,
so that
p0 + · · ·+ pk−1 ≤ w−12 (
x2 − U2(b2)
m− U2(b2)
) < 1,
and therefore
n∑
i=k
pi ≥ 1− w−12 (
x2 − U2(b2)
m− U2(b2)
) := p > 0.
This proves the claim.
Claim 3. Let p and p be as in Claims 1 and 2, and let 0 < ε ≤ min{1− p, p}. Let m and k be as
in Claim 2 and let P ε be a lottery obtained from P by increasing p0 with ε and weakly decreasing,
for i = k, . . . , n, pi with εi ≥ 0 such that ∑ni=k εi = ε. Then there is a number 0 < r(ε) ∈ R,
independent of P , such that RDU2(P
ε) ≥ RDU2(P ) + r(ε).
Proof of Claim 3. Define w(ε) := min{w2(q + ε)− w2(q) : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1− ε}. Observe that w(ε) > 0.
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By rearranging the expression in the definition of RDU and setting a0 := b
2
, we have:
RDU2(P
ε) =
k−1∑
i=0
w2((p
0 + ε) + p1 + · · ·+ pi)[U2(ai)− U2(ai+1)]
+
n−1∑
i=k
w2((p
0 + ε) + p1 + · · ·+ pk−1 + (pk − εk) + · · ·+ (pi − εi))[U2(ai)− U2(ai+1)]
+U2(a
n)
≥
k−1∑
i=0
w2((p
0 + ε) + p1 + · · ·+ pi)[U2(ai)− U2(ai+1)]
+
n−1∑
i=k
w2(p
0 + p1 + · · ·+ pi)[U2(ai)− U2(ai+1)] + U2(an)
≥
k−1∑
i=0
[w2(p
0 + p1 + · · ·+ pi) + w(ε)][U2(ai)− U2(ai+1)]
+
n−1∑
i=k
w2(p
0 + p1 + · · ·+ pi)[U2(ai)− U2(ai+1)] + U2(an)
= RDU2(P ) + w(ε)[U2(a
0)− U2(ak)]
≥ RDU2(P ) + w(ε)[U2(b2)−m].
The claim follows by defining r(ε) := w(ε)[U2(b
2
)−m].
For the next claim, let b1 ∈ argmin{U1(a) : a ∈ A}.
Claim 4. Let η > 0 and letQ = (q1, a1; . . . ; qn, an) andQη = (q˜1, a1; . . . ; q˜n, an) be arbitrary lotteries
such thatQη arises fromQ by shifting around probability such that
∑n
i=1 |qi−q˜i| ≤ η. Then there are
positive numbers M1(η) and M2(η), independent of Q, such that |RDU1(Q)−RDU1(Qη)| ≤M1(η)
and |RDU2(Q)−RDU2(Qη)| ≤M2(η), and, moreover, M1(η),M2(η)→ 0 as η → 0.
Proof of Claim 4. We only prove the first inequality, the proof of the second one is analogous.
Without loss of generality assume U1(a
1) ≥ · · · ≥ U(an). Then
|RDU1(Q)−RDU1(Qη)| = |
n−1∑
i=1
w1(q
1 + · · ·+ qi)[U1(ai)− U1(ai+1)] + U1(an)
−
n−1∑
i=1
w1(q˜
1 + · · ·+ q˜i)[U1(ai)− U1(ai+1)]− U1(an)|
= |
n−1∑
i=1
[w1(q
1 + · · ·+ qi)− w1(q˜1 + · · ·+ q˜i)][U1(ai)− U1(ai+1)]|
≤
n−1∑
i=1
max{|w1(q + η)− w(q)| : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1− η}[U1(ai)− U1(ai+1)]
≤ M1(η),
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with M1(η) := max{|w1(q + η)− w(q)| : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1− η}[U1(b1)− U1(b1)] > 0. Since M1(η) → 0 as
η → 0 the proof of Claim 4 is complete.
We will now complete the proof of the lemma. Take a sequence of lotteries P1, P2, . . . with
(RDU1(P`), RDU2(P`))→ x as `→∞. Assume without loss of generality that
||(RDU1(P`), RDU2(P`)) − x|| < εˆ4 for every `. By (2), RDU2(P`) ≤ x2 for every `. Take η > 0 so
small that M1(η),M2(η) <
εˆ
4
(with M1(η), M2(η) as in Claim 4.). Finally, take ε > 0 with 2ε < η
and 0 < ε ≤ min{1− p, p} (as in Claim 3). Then Claim 3 implies that for an `′ sufficiently large we
have RDU2(P
ε
`′) ≥ RDU2(P`′) + r(ε) > x2, with P ε`′ and r(ε) as in Claim 3. Since 2ε < η it follows
by Claim 4 that |RDU1(P`′)−RDU1(P ε`′)| ≤M1(η) and |RDU2(P`′)−RDU2(P ε`′)| ≤M2(η). Hence,
|RDU1(P`′)−RDU1(P ε`′)| ≤ εˆ4 and |RDU2(P`′)−RDU2(P ε`′)| ≤ εˆ4 . Thus, ||(RDU1(P ε`′), RDU2(P ε`′))−
x|| < εˆ whereas RDU2(P ε`′) > x2, contradicting (2). This completes the proof of lemma. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Let x be the point of S with maximal first coordinate among the points of S
with maximal second coordinate. Similarly, let x be the point of S with maximal second coordinate
among the points of S with maximal first coordinate. Clearly, x and x are Pareto optimal points,
and for every point x ∈ P (S) we have x1 ≤ x1 ≤ x1.
To prove the lemma it is sufficient to prove that for every α ∈ R with x1 ≤ α ≤ x1 there
is a number f(α) ∈ R with (α, f(α)) ∈ P (S): such a number must then be unique and the
implied function f is strictly decreasing and, by Lemma A.2, also continuous. Hence, f satisfies the
requirements of the lemma.
For α = x1 take f(α) = x2 and for α = x1 take f(α) = x2. For α ∈ R with x1 < α < x1 define
f(α) := max{β : (α, β) ∈ S}. Suppose (α, f(α)) /∈ P (S). Then let x be the point with maximal
first coordinate among all points of D := {y ∈ S : y ≥ (α, f(α))} with maximal second coordinate.
Clearly, x ∈ P (S), x1 > α, and x2 < x2. Then Lemma A.2(i) implies that there is a point y ∈ D
with y2 > x2, a contradiction to the definition of x. This completes the proof of the lemma. ¤
For (S, d) ∈ S we define P++(S) = {s ∈ S : there exists no t ∈ S with t1 ≥ s1, t2 ≥ s2 and t 6= s},
P+−(S) = {s ∈ S : there exists no t ∈ S with t1 ≥ s1, t2 ≤ s2 and t 6= s}, P−+(S) = {s ∈ S :
there exists no t ∈ S with t1 ≤ s1, t2 ≥ s2 and t 6= s}, and
P−−(S) = {s ∈ S : there exists no t ∈ S with t1 ≤ s1, t2 ≤ s2 and t 6= s}. Observe that P++(S) =
P (S).
The following lemma is a generalization of Lemma 2.4. The proof can proceed completely
analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.4, and is therefore omitted. The lemma is used in the proof of
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Lemma 2.3.
Lemma A.3 Let (S, d) ∈ S. Then there are closed intervals I++, I+−, I−+, and I−− ⊆ R,
continuous strictly decreasing functions f++ : I++ → R, f−− : I−− → R and continuous strictly
increasing functions f+− : I+− → R, f−+ : I−+ → R such that
P++(S) = {(t, f++(t)) : t ∈ I++},
P+−(S) = {(t, f+−(t)) : t ∈ I+−},
P−+(S) = {(t, f−+(t)) : t ∈ I−+},
P−−(S) = {(t, f−−(t)) : t ∈ I−−}.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We first observe that the points of S with maximal second coordinates
form a straight line segment, possibly consisting of only one point: all these points can be obtained
by lotteries between riskless alternatives with minimal and maximal utility for player 1 among all
the riskless alternatives that have maximal utility for player 2. The same is true for all points with
minimal second coordinates, or maximal or minimal first coordinates.
Let s, t ∈ S be points that have one coordinate in common. Without loss of generality assume
s1 < t1 and s2 = t2. If s2 is maximal or minimal in S then [s, t] ⊆ S follows from the observations
in preceding paragraph. Otherwise, any point h ∈ [s, t] strictly between s and t satisfies condition
(ii) in the definition of a hole: this follows from the observations in the preceding paragraph and
from Lemma A.3. Suppose that there would be such an h with h /∈ S. Since S is closed there must
be an ε-neigborhood of h that is not in S. Hence, h satisfies also condition (i) in the definition of
a hole, and thus S has a hole. This contradicts Lemma A.1 and completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Let I = [α, β]. If α 6= β, define the continuous strictly increasing function
w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by
w(
β − t
β − α) =
f(t)− f(β)
f(α)− f(β)
for every t ∈ I. In particular, w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1, so that w satisfies all the requirements of a
weighting function.
If α = β, then for a take any point in R2 with a < (α, f(α)).
Define A = {a, (α, a2), (α, f(α)), (a1, f(α))}.
If α 6= β then take a = (α, f(β)). Define A = {a, (β, f(β)), (α, f(α))}.
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Define Ui(a) = ai for all a ∈ A and i ∈ {1, 2}, w1(p) = p and w2(p) = w(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Let
B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2). By construction,
{(t, f(t)) : t ∈ I} = {(RDU1(P ), RDU2(P )) : P = ((α, f(α)), p; (β, f(β)), 1−p) for some p ∈ [0, 1].}
This is the set P (B), and by Lemma 2.3, S(B) = {x ∈ R2 : a ≤ x ≤ (t, f(t)) for some t ∈ I}. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2), C = (A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2) ∈ B+ such that
RDU2 is associated with U2 and w2 and R˜DU2 with U˜2 = k ◦ U2 and w2 for a concave strictly
increasing transformation k : R→ R. It can be assumed that U˜2 is scaled such that d(B) = d(C)
and u(B) = u(C), since the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is scale invariant (see Theorem 4.1). This
implies that U˜2(a) ≥ U2(a) for all a ∈ A and therefore,
R˜DU2(P ) ≥ RDU2(P ) (3)
for all P ∈ L(A). Consider KS(B). Because d(B) = d(C) and u(B) = u(C), we either have
KS(B) ≤ KS(C) or KS(B) > KS(C). Weak Pareto optimality of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
(see Theorem 4.1) and (3) imply KS(B) ≤ KS(C), hence KS1(B) ≤ KS1(C). ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2), C = (A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2) ∈ B+ such that
RDU2 is associated with U2 and w2 and R˜DU2 with U2 and w˜2 where w2(p) ≥ w˜2(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
(Hence, without loss of generality we have scaled the utility function of player 2 in C such that it
is equal to U2, cf. Lemma 2.2.) Then by Lemma 2.2, part 2,
RDU2(P ) ≥ R˜DU2(P ) (4)
for all P ∈ L(A). Consider KS(C). Because d(B) = d(C) and u(B) = u(C), either KS(C) ≤
KS(B) or KS(C) > KS(B). Weak Pareto optimality of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (see The-
orem 4.1) and (4) imply KS(C) ≤ KS(B), hence KS1(B) ≥ KS1(C). ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Let B = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2), C = (A, a,RDU1, R˜DU2) ∈ B such that
RDU2 is associated with U2 and w2 and R˜DU2 with U2 and w˜2 where w2(p) ≥ w˜2(p) for all
p ∈ [0, 1]—this is similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.2—and u2(B)−d2(B)
u1(B)−d1(B) ≤
u2(C)−d2(C)
u1(C)−d1(C) . Because
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is scale invariant (see Theorem 4.1) we can assume without loss of
generality that d(B) = d(C) = (0, 0).
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Define H(C) to be the maximal point of S(C) on the line segment with d(B) and u(S(B), d(B))
as endpoints. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, it can be shown that
H(C) ≤ KS(B). (5)
From Lemma 2.4 it follows that H(C) is Pareto optimal. Suppose that KS1(C) > H1(C). Then,
KS2(C) =
u2(C)
u1(C)
KS1(C) ≥ u2(B)u1(B)KS1(C) >
u2(B)
u1(B)
H1(C) = H2(C). This contradicts the Pareto
optimality of H(C). It follows that
KS1(C) ≤ H1(C). (6)
From (5) and (6),
KS1(C) ≤ KS1(B),
which was to be proved. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Symmetry, scale invariance and individual monotonicity of the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution are immediate. (Weak) Pareto optimality follows from Lemma 2.4.
Let F be a bargaining solution which satisfies symmetry, scale invariance, weak Pareto optimality
and individual monotonicity. We show that F = KS. Our proof deviates from the proof in Kalai
and Smorodinsky [5] because also certain nonconvex feasible sets are permitted.
Let (S, d) ∈ S. Define T = {as + b : s ∈ S} with a = ( 1
u1(S,d)−d1 ,
1
u2(S,d)−d2 ) and b = −ad. Then
(T, 0) ∈ S, (where we write 0 instead of (0, 0)) and scale invariance implies
KS(T, 0) = aKS(S, d) + b and
F (T, 0) = aF (S, d) + b.
So it is sufficient to prove that KS(T, 0) = F (T, 0). Note that u(T, 0) = (1, 1) and, therefore,
KS1(T, 0) = KS2(T, 0).
Let C = (A, a,RDU1, RDU2) ∈ B such that T = S(C) and 0 = d(C). Let U1 and U2 be the
associated utility functions.
First consider the case that u(T, 0) = (1, 1) ∈ T , hence KS(T, 0) = (1, 1). Since, by Lemma
2.4, P (T ) = {(1, 1)}, there must be an a ∈ A with (1, 1) = (RDU1(a), RDU2(a)). Define C ′ =
({a, a}, a, RDU1, RDU2) ∈ B where RDU1 and RDU2 are the restrictions of the rank dependent
utility functionals in C. With L := S(C ′), we have F (L, 0) = (1, 1) by weak Pareto optimality of
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F . By individual monotonicity of F applied to L ⊆ T we have F (T, 0) ≥ F (L, 0) = (1, 1), hence
F (T, 0) = (1, 1) = KS(T, 0). This completes the proof of the theorem for this case.
Second and last, consider the case that u(T, 0) = (1, 1) /∈ T , hence KS(T, 0) < (1, 1). By
Lemma 2.4 there is a function f , the graph of which coincides with P (T ). Define y := (min{x1 :
x ∈ T},min{x2 : x ∈ T}). Let B = (A, (0, 0), RDU1, RDU2), where
A = {(U1(a), U2(a)) : a ∈ A} ∪ {y, (y1,max{x2 : x ∈ T}), (max{x1 : x ∈ T}, y2)},
with the utility functions U i defined by U i(x) = xi for every x ∈ A, and with weighting functions
wi equal to those in C. Then d(B) = 0, P (B) = P (T ), and
S(B) = {x ∈ R2 : y ≤ x ≤ x′ for some x′ ∈ P (T )}.
Denote T˜ = S(B). Then u(T˜ , 0) = (1, 1) and T ⊆ T˜ , so by individual monotonicity of F , F (T˜ , 0) ≥
F (T, 0). Since KS(T˜ , 0) = KS(T, 0), it is sufficient to show that F (T˜ , 0) = KS(T˜ , 0): then
KS(T, 0) ≥ F (T, 0) which implies KS(T, 0) = F (T, 0) since KS(T, 0) < (1, 1).
Let z := KS(T˜ , 0) (so z1 = z2) and let f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a continuous strictly decreasing
function with (t, f(t)) ∈ T˜ , f(z1) = z2, and f(t) = f−1(t) for every t ∈ [0, 1]. Then f(0) = 1,
f(1) = 0, and by Lemma 2.5 and its proof there is a (V, 0) ∈ S with P (V ) equal to the graph of
f and V = {x ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ x′ for some x′ ∈ P (V )}. Because V is symmetric by construction,
symmetry and weak Pareto optimality of F imply F (V, 0) = z. Since u(V, 0) = (1, 1) and V ⊆ T˜ ,
individual monotonicity of F implies F (T˜ , 0) ≥ F (V, 0) = z, hence F (T˜ , 0) = z = KS(T˜ , 0) since
z ∈ P (T˜ ). This completes the proof of the second case, and hence of the theorem. ¤
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